The Office of Inspector
General (OIG) for the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has released an
assessment of the FHFA’s oversight of troubled banks within the Federal Home
Loan Bank (FHLBank) System. While the OIG found positive actions on the part of
FHFA, it specifically criticized a lack
of policies, systems, and documentation standards that could strengthen that
oversight.
Of the 12 FHLBanks that
exist regionally, four have experienced significant financial and operational
difficulties dating back to at least 2008.
The four, located in Boston, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Seattle and
classified as of “supervisory concern” due to problems arising from their investments
in certain high-risk mortgage securities.
The primary mission of FHLBanks
is to support housing finance and the system issues debt in the capital markets
at relatively favorable rates due to its status as a government sponsored
enterprise (GSE). The proceeds of the
debt are used by the individual banks to make secured “advances” to member
financial institutions which secure these advances using single-family
mortgages or investment-grade securities as collateral. The FHLBanks also hold investment portfolios
that contain assets such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
FHFA has oversight
responsibility for the FHLBanks and recognizes the need to ensure that they do
not abuse their GSE status or act imprudently.
FHFA’s own examination guidance states that the agency will initiate a
formal enforcement action, such as a cease and desist order, when a bank is
identified as having significant “supervisory concerns” within the system.
According to the OIG,
the four troubled banks have experienced “significant financial and operational
deterioration primarily due to their investments in private-label MBS secured
by non-traditional mortgages.” Two of
the banks, in fact, hold more than twice the level of securities rated “below
investment grade” than the average for the eight healthier banks.

Another
identified risk is a concentration of advances in a few member banks. Both the Pittsburgh and Seattle banks have a
high percentage of their advance business confined to ten members (the
situation only recently changed in respect to Boston) which leaves them
vulnerable should one or more such institutions fail or withdraw from the
system. OIG also found that the troubled
banks tend to demonstrate a limited demand for advances, a high percentage of
investments to total assets, and significant risk management and operational
deficiencies.

OIG
said a major concern is that troubled FHLBanks potentially have greater
incentives to engage in higher risk business strategies in order to achieve
higher returns. This means that FHFA
needs to monitor their activities and control actions that could potentially
lead to greater financial and operational deterioration and cause greater
long-term risks.
The
OIG found that FHFA has taken some steps to monitor and control the four banks
which present “supervisory concern.”
-
Ensuring that they
restrict the payment of dividends to preserve their retained earnings and
capital. -
Encouraging FHLBank
boards to place limits on investment activities. -
Monitoring through
annual examinations and regular communications. -
Discussing with board
members and managers the possibility of merging with healthier FHLBanks.
While
FHFA’s examination guidance specifies enforcement, OIG claims that FHFA does
not view this as constituting a policy or requiring a course of action. FHFA believes, by initiating enforcement
action on a case-by-case basis it has acted appropriately.
The
OIG disagrees and views “FHFA’s lack of a consistent and transparent written
enforcement policy as undermining the Agency’s oversight of troubled FHLBanks.” FHFA and its predecessor FHFB have initiated
formal enforcement against only two of the banks, Consent Orders issued against
Chicago in 2007 and Seattle in 2010.
OIG
faulted FHFA for the following:
-
Its failure to
establish a clear, consistent and transparent written enforcement policy for
troubled banks has led to a discretion-based approach. This, in turn, has resulted in a lack of
clarity for FHFA examination staff and the banks, neither of which have steady
benchmarks against which to gauge their actions. -
The Agency has not
established an automated management information reporting system to track
FHLBank examinations finds. By relying
instead on a manual system, FHFA managers are limited in their ability to
assess the extent to which individual banks are correcting deficiencies and
this has also impeded the ability of the OIG to assess the effectiveness of the
Agency’s oversight efforts. -
FHFA does not
consistently document key actions with respect to its oversight of the troubled
banks. This was a problem that OIG found
particularly troublesome as applied to personnel actions as it identified cases
where FHFA had influenced boards to terminate employees without adequately
documenting its actions or the reasons for them.
In
concluding its report the OIG made three specific recommendations which
paralleled the above findings; recommending that FHFA
-
Develop and implement a
clear, consistent and transparent written enforcement policy that requires
troubled banks to correct identified deficiencies within a specific time frame,
establishes consequences for failure to do so, and defines exceptions to the
policy. -
Develop and implement a
reporting system that permits Agency managers and outside reviewers to assess
examination report findings, planned corrective actions and timeframes, and
their status. -
Document key activities
consistently including personnel actions involving FHLBanks.
The performance period for this
evaluation was from May 2011 to November 2011.
…(read more)

FHFA Outlines Strategic Plan, Goals for Next Four Years
The Federal Housing Finance Agency released a draft of its Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2013-2017 this morning. The document, which lays out goals for those years and methods for achieving them, is available for public comment until June 13.
In the time available for reviewing the document in juxtaposition with the final Strategic Plan for 2009 – 2013 is was not possible, especially given the different formats, to pick out differences and changes that might reflect a change in policy rather than the passage of time however there were three proposed initiatives that did jump out. These were among the methods suggested for accomplishing Goal 4, Prepare for the Future of Housing Finance in the United States.
For the remainder, we have summarized the main goals and expanded on some of the other proposed strategies that seem to go beyond government-required management boilerplate.
Goal 1: Safe and Sound Housing GSE’s
Goal 2: Stability, Liquidity, and Access to Housing Finance
FHFA said it will explore more private-sector risk-sharing
opportunities and will continue to explore options to support a stable
transition to a system with greater private sector participation. While
Congress is discussing the form in which this system will emerge, FHFA
will concentrate on retaining value in the business operations of the
GSEs.
To this end, FHFA will monitor their use of derivatives by
establishing capital and margin requirements for swap transactions that
have not been cleared as part of the joint rulemaking process and will
monitor the GSEs readiness for and move to central clearing. This
transition will be monitored to determine the cost and effectiveness of
interest rate risk management, the level of operation risk, and
borrowing costs at the GSEs.
FHFA will also work with the GSEs to improve improving home retention
initiatives and develop alternatives to dispose of real estate owned
(REO) by the GSEs.
FHFA will monitor Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) to ensure their
liquidity to respond promptly to sudden increases in demand for advances
and to ensure there are no unnecessary impediments to their ability to
efficiently and competitively provide liquidity for housing markets
through normal or stressed markets and during cycles of expansion and
contraction.
The agency plans to assess and monitor the potential impact on the
Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) resulting from the new capital rules
and liquidity required by the Basel III Accord .
FHFA will require that the Enterprises avoid and unwarranted policies or
practices that favor large institutions to the disadvantage of small
ones and will ensure minority and women inclusion in the activities of
the GSEs. It will also examine FHLBanks to ensure they are
administering their business fairly and impartially and without
discrimination in favor or against any member.
FHFA said that the next two goals are established as immediate goals which it plans to achieve within the next two to three years
Goal 3: Preserve and Conserve Enterprise Assets
Goal 4: Prepare for the future of housing finance in the U.S.
The GSEs have bought or guaranteed approximately 75 percent of mortgages originated
in the country since entering into conservatorship in September 2008.
The challenge for FHFA is how to reduce that position in the marketplace
without comparable private-sector players. In addition to the three
proposals covered at the beginning of this summary and some strategies
that duplicate those for Goal 3, the following are the key strategies
for accomplishing Goal 4.
…(read more)