Majority of States Reported on Board with Robo-Signing Settlement

Details are still sketchy, but
apparently a settlement has been agreed upon between five major banks and a
majority of the states’ attorneys general. 
The settlement involves Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup,
JPMorgan Chase, and Ally Financial and arises out of charges that the banks and
their subsidiary servicers used robo-signing and other abuses in processing
thousands of foreclosures.

The settlement was announced by lead
negotiator, Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller who, according to CNBC said of the
deal, “This enables us to move forward
into the very final stages of remaining work. Federal and state officials, as
well as representatives from the banks, continue to address matters that they
must complete before finalizing any settlement,” Miller said in a statement
released late Monday…

…(read more)

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MERS, Banks Sued by New York State; MERSCORP Responds

Three major banks and Virginia-based
MERSCORP, Inc. and its subsidiary Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems
(MERS) were sued Friday by the state of New York.  The suit, filed by the state’s Attorney
General Eric T. Schneiderman
, charges that the creation and use of a privately
national electronic registration system, MERS, “has resulted in a wide range of deceptive and fraudulent foreclosure
filings in New York state and federal courts, harming homeowners and
undermining the integrity of the judicial foreclosure process.”  Further, the lawsuit charges that the
employees and agents of the three banks, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase,
and Wells Fargo
, acting as “MERS certifying officers,” have
repeatedly submitted court documents containing false and misleading information
that made it appear that the foreclosing party had the authority to bring a
case when in fact it may not have.  The
suit also names additional defendants for some of the charges including loan
servicing subsidiaries of the three banks.

The
lawsuit, filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County levies
the following charges:   

  • MERS was created to allow financial
    institutions to evade country recording fees, avoid the need to publicly record
    mortgage transfers and facilitate the rapid sale and securitization of
    mortgages. MERS members log all of their
    transfers in a private electronic registry rather than in the local county
    clerk’s office.
     
  • MERS is a shell company with no
    economic interest in any mortgage loan.
    It is the nominal “mortgagee” of the loan in the public records and
    remains as such regardless of how often the loan is sold or transferred among
    its members.
     
  • MERS has few or no employees but
    serves as the mortgagee for tens of millions of mortgages. It has indiscriminately designated over
    20,000 MERS member employees as MERS “certifying officers” expressly
    authorizing them to assign MERS mortgages and execute paperwork to foreclose on
    properties and submit claims in bankruptcy proceedings while failing to
    adequately screen, train, or monitor their activities. Assignments were often automatically
    generated and “robo-signed” by individuals who did not review the
    underlying property ownership records, confirm the documents’ accuracy, or even
    read the documents. MERS certifying
    officers have regularly executed and submitted in court mortgage assignments
    and other legal documents on behalf of MERS without disclosing that they are
    not MERS employees, but instead are employed by other entities, such as the
    mortgage servicer filing the case or its counsel.
     
  • Use of the private database to
    record property transfers has eliminated homeowners’ and the public’s ability
    to track them through the traditional public records system. This data base is plagued with inaccuracies
    and errors which make it difficult to verify the chain of title or the current
    note-holder. In addition, as a result of these
    inaccuracies, MERS has filed mortgage satisfactions against the wrong property.
     
  • This “bizarre and complex end-around
    of the traditional recording system” has saved banks more than $2 billion in
    recording fees and allowed the banks to securitize and sell millions of loans, “often
    misrepresenting the quality and nature of the mortgages being transferred.”
     
  • The creation and use of the MERS
    System by the Defendant Servicers and other financial institutions has resulted
    in a wide range of deceptive and illegal practices, particularly with respect
    to the filing of New York foreclosure proceedings in state courts and federal
    bankruptcy proceedings.

The lawsuit estimates that MERS
members have brought over 13,000 foreclosures against New York homeowners
naming MERS as the foreclosing property when in many cases MERS lacks the
standing to foreclosure.  Even when
foreclosures were not initiated in MERS name, proceedings related to their
registered loans often included deceptive information.

The lawsuit seeks a declaration that
the alleged practices violate the law, as well as injunctive relief, damages
for harmed homeowners, and civil penalties. The lawsuit also seeks a court
order requiring defendants to take all actions necessary to cure any title
defects and clear any improper liens resulting from their fraudulent and
deceptive acts and practices.

On January 24 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 11th Judicial Court upheld an appeal from MERS that
contended a lower court had erred in finding that a homeowner had been
improperly foreclosed on by MERS on the grounds that:

1).   The assignment of the security deed was
invalid because MERS, as nominee of a defunct lender could not assign the
documents of its own volition.

2.
    The “splitting” of the mortgage and
the note rendered the mortgage null and void and therefore notices of
foreclosure were invalid as not coming from a secured creditor.

The New York suit differs slightly from
the facts in Smith V. Saxon Mortgage,
but if Schneiderman wins his case, it could be that the legitimacy of MERS will
ultimately have to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.

…(read more)

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SEC Names Ex-Credit Suisse Employees in Subprime Fraud Scheme

Four
former investment bankers and traders from the Credit Suisse Group were charged
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Wednesday violating multiple
sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 while trading in subprime
mortgage bonds
.  The indictments allege
the four engaged in a complex scheme to fraudulently overstate the prices of $3
billion of the bonds during the height of the subprime credit crisis. 

The
four are Kareem Serageldin, the group’s former global head of structured credit
trading; David Higgs, former head of hedge trading; and two traders, Faisal Siddiqui and Salmaan
Siddiqui.  According to the complaint
filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Serageldin
oversaw a significant portion of Credit Suisse’s structured products and
mortgage-related businesses. The traders reported to Higgs and Serageldin.

The SEC charges that the four
deliberately ignored specific market information showing that prices of the
subject bonds were declining sharply, pricing them instead in a way that
allowed Credit Suisse to achieve fictional profits, and, through the traders,
changing bond prices in order to hit daily and monthly profit target and cover
losses.  The scheme was driven in part by
the prospect of lavish year-end bonuses and promotions.  The scheme hit its peak at the end of 2007.

“The
stunning scale of the illegal mismarking in this case was surpassed only by the
greed of the senior bankers behind the scheme,” said Robert Khuzami, Director
of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement and a Co-Chair of the newly formed Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group
, “At precisely the moment investors
and market participants were urgently seeking accurate information about
financial institutions’ exposure to the subprime market, the senior bankers
falsely and selfishly inflated the value of more than $3 billion in
asset-backed securities in order to protect their bonuses and, in one case,
protect a highly coveted promotion.”  

SEC
explained that it was not charging Credit Suisse in the scheme because the
wrongdoing was isolated; Credit Suisse reported the violations to the SEC,
voluntarily terminated the four, implemented internal controls to prevent
additional misconduct, and cooperated with SEC in the investigation.  The SEC said that the four named in the
complaint also cooperated in the investigation and that assistance was provided
by the FBI, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
and the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority.

…(read more)

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FHFA Answers Conflict of Interest Charges against Freddie Mac

The
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) issued a statement late Monday refuting a
story
from ProPublic and NPR
that a complicated investment strategy utilized by Freddie Mac had influenced
it to discourage refinancing of some of its mortgages.  FHFA confirmed that the investments using
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) exist but said they did not impact
refinancing decisions and that their use has ended. (the NPR Story)

Freddie Mac’s charter calls for
it to make home loans more accessible, both to purchase and refinance their
homes but the ProPublica story, written by Jesse
Eisinger (ProPublica) and Chris Arnold (NPR) charged that the CMO trades “give Freddie a powerful incentive to do
the opposite
, highlighting a conflict of interest at the heart of the company.
In addition to being an instrument of government policy dedicated to making
home loans more accessible, Freddie also has giant investment portfolios and
could lose substantial amounts of money if too many borrowers refinance.”

Here,
in a nutshell, is what the story (we are quoting from an “updated” version)
says Freddie has been doing.  

Freddie
creates a security (MBS) backed by mortgages it guarantees which was divided
into two parts.  The larger portion, backed
by principal, was fairly low risk, paid a low return and was sold to investors.  The smaller portion, backed by interest
payments on the mortgages, was riskier, and paid a higher return determined by
the interest rates on the underlying loans. 
This portion, called an inverse floater, was retained by Freddie Mac.

In
2010 and 2011 Freddie Mac’s purchase (retention) of these inverse floaters rose
dramatically, from a total of 12 purchased in 2008 and 2009 to 29.  Most of the mortgages backing these floaters had
interest rates of 6.5 to 7 percent.

In
structuring these transactions, Freddie Mac sells off most of the value of the
MBS but does not reduce its risk because it still guarantees the underlying
mortgages and must pay the entire value in the case of default.  The floaters, stripped of the real value of
the underlying principal, are also now harder and possibly more expensive to
sell, and as Freddie gets paid the difference between the interest rates on the
loans and the current interest rate, if rates rise, the value of the floaters
falls. 

While
Freddie, under its agreement with the Treasury Department, has reduced the size
of its portfolio by 6 percent between 2010 and 2011, “that $43 billion drop in
the portfolio overstates the risk reduction because the company retained risk
through the inverse floaters
.”

Since
the real value of the floater is the high rate of interest being paid by the
mortgagee, if large numbers pay off their loans the floater loses value.  Thus, the article charges, Freddie has tried
to deter prospective refinancers by tightening its underwriting guidelines and
raising prices.  It cites, as its sole
example of tightened standards that in October 2010 the company changed a rule
that had prohibited financing for persons who had engaged in some short sales
to prohibiting financing for persons who had engaged in any short sale, but it
also quotes critics who charge that the Home Affordable Refinance Program
(HARP) could be reaching “millions more people if Fannie (Mae) and Freddie
implemented the program more effectively.”

It
has discouraged refinancing by raising fees. 
During Thanksgiving week in 2010, the article contends, Freddie quietly
announced it was raising post-settlement delivery fees.  In November 2011, FHFA announced that the
GSEs were eliminating or reducing some fees but the Federal Reserve said that “more
might be done.”

If
Freddie Mac has limited refinancing, the article says, it also affected the whole
economy which might benefit from billions of dollars of discretionary income generated
through lower mortgage payments.  Refinancing
might also reduce foreclosures and limit the losses the GSEs suffer through defaults
of their guaranteed loans.

The
authors say there is no evidence that decisions about trades and decisions
about refinancing were coordinated.  “The
company is a key gatekeeper for home loans but says its traders are “walled
off” from the officials who have restricted homeowners from taking advantage of
historically low interest rates by imposing higher fees and new rules.”

ProPublica/NPR says that the
floater trades “raise questions about the FHFA’s oversight of Fannie and
Freddie” as a regulator but, as conservator it also acts as the board of
directors and shareholders and has emphasized that its main goal is to limit
taxpayer losses.  This has frustrated the
administration because FHFA has made preserving the companies’ assets a
priority over helping homeowners.  The
President tried to replace acting director Edward J. DeMarco, but Congress
refused to confirm his nominee. 

The
authors conclude by saying that FHFA knew about the inverse floater trades
before they were approached about the story but officials declined to comment on whether the
FHFA knew about them as Freddie was conducting them or whether the FHFA had
explicitly approved them.”

The
FHFA statement
said that Freddie Mac has historically used CMOs as a tool to
manage its retained portfolio and to address issues associated with security
performance.  The inverse floaters were
used to finance mortgages sold to Freddie through its cash window and to sell
mortgages out of its portfolio “in response to market demand and to shrink its
own portfolio.”  The inverse floater
essentially leaves Freddie with a portion of the risk exposure it would have
had if it had kept the entire mortgage on its balance sheet and also results in
a more complex financing structure that requires specialized risk management
processes.  (Full FHFA Statement)

The
agency said that for several reasons Freddie’s retention of inverse floaters ended in
2011 and only $5 billion is held in the company’s $650 billion retained
portfolio.  Later that year FHFA staff
identified concerns about the floaters and the company agreed that these
transactions would not resume pending completing of the agency examination.

These
investments FHFA said did not have any impact on the recent changes to
HARP.  In evaluating changes, FHFA
specifically directed both Freddie and Fannie not to consider changes in their
own investment income in the HARP evaluation process and now that the HARP
changes are in place the refinance process is between borrowers and loan
originators and servicers, not Freddie Mac.

…(read more)

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HUD CHARGES MASSACHUSETTS APARTMENT BUILDING OWNER WITH DISCRIMINATING AGAINST FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) announced today that it is charging the owner of a 24-unit apartment building in Holyoke, Massachusetts, with housing discrimination for denying units to families that have children. HUD’s charge alleges that Nilma Fichera, who owns and manages New York-based N.A.G. Realty, LLC, violated the Fair Housing Act when she refused to show or rent apartments to families with children because she could not certify that the building was free of lead-based paint.